Watching Michael Moore's movie is more than just watching a movie, it is seeing through the anger and at the same time sincerity of a person i barely know.
Being born in a conservative Chinese family means money is the supreme value. It s the religion! It s the communal value! It is almost the presupposed norm. Questioning it is similar to a pagan questioning Christianity through science. It is a heresy. It is a sin. And a sin, as they promised or as prophesied, is punished severely.
Through this valley of shadow, I rebelled. I am frustrated, and hurt badly. I sense that something is wrong with it, but my whole limbs are cuffed. My community told me that money is almost the god. It is almost as I am being taught (or indoctrinated) that money is the god I must worship. Worshiping a god means I must obey non-conditionally to the end-purpose of being rich. Being rich means having the ability to devour fancy meals in fancy restaurants, to provide good (most of time excessive) prosperity to family members, to elevate social status and being respected, to become a successful individual, to be a well-rounded individual, to be the purpose of existing! and to stay in a comfort zone.
And since life is such a huge struggle, one must dare to sacrifice the others for him/herself. In a practical sense, it means employ people from the lowest caste (economic or social sense) and exploit them. Give them the hope that if you work really hard for me, you can be rich one days. It means (legally) steal from them by indirectly (provision of false hope) luring them to generate 100 for us and give them back 4 for their "salaries". It also means give them bigger hope but smaller reality for margin of self-improvement. We tell them that they can develop and improve themselves if they work/study hard. But we make sure their margin of development stays down, down there in such a way that they will never be anywhere around us to take over our business or profession. That s the way fucked up capitalists work!
That s the way big fat banks, lawfirms, financial consultants, corporations work! They enslave us under the false hope of prosperity.
Seriously, I know almost all the arguments for capitalists, efficiency, the fundamental essence of freedom, creativity, innovation, rights.. Blablabla. The idea is goddess, but severely abused in practice.
In a similar fashion, the idea and concept of most religions is good, but the goddess idea is severely abused and exploited by those in power for their pure evil greed!
I still retain a scintilla of hope for capitalism ideal. I believe there are some good left despite all the hemorrhage it suffers. But what I cannot stand is the capitalists! It s like an evil disguising itself in the form of a child. Using complete innocence for the most evil deed. It s like the most trusted father raping his own daughter. It s like the police who ought to "serve and protect" enslaving and torturing citizens.
Humans are the worst form of animals we may have ever witnessed. When someone does something immoral/socially deviant, we immediately associate him/her as an animal, with no conscience and barbaric.
You know what is worse than that animal? A fully functioning conscientious human performing more elaborate barbaric evil deeds!
Wednesday, June 30, 2010
Tuesday, June 29, 2010
East Versus West on the Trinity: The Filioque Controversy
imported from http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2010/06/eastern-orthodoxy-on-the-trinity.html
Filioque Controversy Our meeting with the affable and stimulating Dale Tuggy on June 20th at St. Anthony's Greek Orthodox monastery a little south of Florence, Arizona, got me thinking about the Trinity again. So I pulled Timothy Ware's The Orthodox Church off the shelf wherein I found a discussion of the differences between the Eastern Orthodox and Roman approaches to the doctrine. Let's take a look. Earlier this year, in January and February, we had a stimulating and deep-going discussion of Trinitarian topics which the interested reader can find here. But there was no discussion of the Orthodox line. It is high time to fill that lacuna.
East and West agree that there is exactly one God in three divine persons, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. They also agree that the Father is neither born of anything nor proceeds from anything, that the Son is born of the Father but does not proceed from the Father, and that the Holy Spirit proceeds but is not born. Bear in mind that 'born' and 'proceeds' in this context refer to relations that are internal to the triune Godhead, and are therefore eternal relations. I hope it is also clear that neither of these relations is one of creation. Each of the persons is eternal and uncreated.
The main difference between East and West concerns that from which the Holy Spirit proceeds. The West says that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son (filioque), whereas the East says that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone. One can of course question whether this dispute has any clear sense, but let's assume that it does for the space of this post. I don't reckon there are any Stovian or other positivists hanging around this site. (If there are, I pronounce my anathema upon them.)
The question is whether there is any reason to prefer the one view over the other. Ware naturally thinks the Orthodox view superior (pp. 219-222). He thinks it is superior because it is able to account for the unity of the three persons without making of this unity something impersonal. His reasoning is as follows. The tripersonal God is one God, not three Gods. So the question arises as to the unity of the Godhead. What is the ground of God's unity? There is one God because there is one Father, the Father being the 'cause' or 'source' of Godhead, the principle (arche) of unity among the three. The Orthodox speak of the "monarchy of the Father." The other two persons originate from the Father. Because the principle of unity is the Father, and the Father is one of the divine persons, the principle of unity is personal in nature. So although there are three persons in one God, the unity of these three persons is itself a person, namely, the Father.
The Western view, however, issues in the result that the principle of unity is impersonal. The reasoning is along the following lines. If the Holy Spirit proceeds eternally from the Father and the Son, then "the Father ceases to be the unique source of Godhead, since the Son is also a source." (219) Consequently, "...Rome finds its principle of unity in the substance or essence which all three persons share." (219) This implies that, on the Roman Catholic view, the principle of unity is impersonal. (I am merely reporting Ware's reasoning here, not endorsing it.)
And that, Ware maintains, is not good. "Late Scholastic theology, emphasizing as it does the essence at the expense of the persons, comes near to turning God into an abstract idea." (222) The concrete and personal God with whom one can have a direct and living encounter gets transmogrified into a God of the philosophers (as opposed to the living God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob), an impersonal being whose existence needs to be proved by metaphysical arguments.
And so the Orthodox "regard the filioque as dangerous and heretical. Filioquism confuses the persons, and destroys the proper balance between unity and diversity in the Godhead." (222) God is stripped of concrete personality and made into an abstract essence. And that's not all. The Roman view gives the Holy Spirit short shrift with the result that his role in the church and in the lives of believers is downplayed. What's more, this subordination of the Holy Spirit, together with an overemphasis on the divine unity, has deleterious consequences for ecclesiology. As a result of filioquism, the church in the West has become too worldly an institution, and the excessive emphasis on divine unity has led to too much centralization and too great an emphasis on papal authority. It is worth noting in this connection that the Orthodox reject papal infallibility while accepting the infallibility of the church.
You can see, then, that for the Orthodox the filioque is quite a big deal: it is not a mere theological Spitzfindigkeit.
Ware's exposition -- which I assume is a faithful representation of the Orthodox position -- saddles filioquism with a nasty dilemma: either ditheism or semi-Sabellianism. For if the Son as well as the Father is an arche, a principle of unity in the Godhead, then the upshot is ditheism, two-God-ism. But if it is said that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son tamquam ex/ab uno principio, 'as from one principle,' then, as the Orthodox see it, the Father and the Son are confused and semi-Sabellianism is the upshot. (221)
Sabellianism or modalism is the view that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are modes or aspects of the deity. The East sees semi-Sabellianism in the West insofar as the Western view, in avoiding ditheism, merges Father and Son into one principle so that they become mere modes or aspect of that one principle.
That's the lay of the land as seen from the East. I have been concerned in this post with exposition only. Adjudication can wait for later. (He said magisterially.)
Filioque Controversy Our meeting with the affable and stimulating Dale Tuggy on June 20th at St. Anthony's Greek Orthodox monastery a little south of Florence, Arizona, got me thinking about the Trinity again. So I pulled Timothy Ware's The Orthodox Church off the shelf wherein I found a discussion of the differences between the Eastern Orthodox and Roman approaches to the doctrine. Let's take a look. Earlier this year, in January and February, we had a stimulating and deep-going discussion of Trinitarian topics which the interested reader can find here. But there was no discussion of the Orthodox line. It is high time to fill that lacuna.
East and West agree that there is exactly one God in three divine persons, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. They also agree that the Father is neither born of anything nor proceeds from anything, that the Son is born of the Father but does not proceed from the Father, and that the Holy Spirit proceeds but is not born. Bear in mind that 'born' and 'proceeds' in this context refer to relations that are internal to the triune Godhead, and are therefore eternal relations. I hope it is also clear that neither of these relations is one of creation. Each of the persons is eternal and uncreated.
The main difference between East and West concerns that from which the Holy Spirit proceeds. The West says that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son (filioque), whereas the East says that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone. One can of course question whether this dispute has any clear sense, but let's assume that it does for the space of this post. I don't reckon there are any Stovian or other positivists hanging around this site. (If there are, I pronounce my anathema upon them.)
The question is whether there is any reason to prefer the one view over the other. Ware naturally thinks the Orthodox view superior (pp. 219-222). He thinks it is superior because it is able to account for the unity of the three persons without making of this unity something impersonal. His reasoning is as follows. The tripersonal God is one God, not three Gods. So the question arises as to the unity of the Godhead. What is the ground of God's unity? There is one God because there is one Father, the Father being the 'cause' or 'source' of Godhead, the principle (arche) of unity among the three. The Orthodox speak of the "monarchy of the Father." The other two persons originate from the Father. Because the principle of unity is the Father, and the Father is one of the divine persons, the principle of unity is personal in nature. So although there are three persons in one God, the unity of these three persons is itself a person, namely, the Father.
The Western view, however, issues in the result that the principle of unity is impersonal. The reasoning is along the following lines. If the Holy Spirit proceeds eternally from the Father and the Son, then "the Father ceases to be the unique source of Godhead, since the Son is also a source." (219) Consequently, "...Rome finds its principle of unity in the substance or essence which all three persons share." (219) This implies that, on the Roman Catholic view, the principle of unity is impersonal. (I am merely reporting Ware's reasoning here, not endorsing it.)
And that, Ware maintains, is not good. "Late Scholastic theology, emphasizing as it does the essence at the expense of the persons, comes near to turning God into an abstract idea." (222) The concrete and personal God with whom one can have a direct and living encounter gets transmogrified into a God of the philosophers (as opposed to the living God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob), an impersonal being whose existence needs to be proved by metaphysical arguments.
And so the Orthodox "regard the filioque as dangerous and heretical. Filioquism confuses the persons, and destroys the proper balance between unity and diversity in the Godhead." (222) God is stripped of concrete personality and made into an abstract essence. And that's not all. The Roman view gives the Holy Spirit short shrift with the result that his role in the church and in the lives of believers is downplayed. What's more, this subordination of the Holy Spirit, together with an overemphasis on the divine unity, has deleterious consequences for ecclesiology. As a result of filioquism, the church in the West has become too worldly an institution, and the excessive emphasis on divine unity has led to too much centralization and too great an emphasis on papal authority. It is worth noting in this connection that the Orthodox reject papal infallibility while accepting the infallibility of the church.
You can see, then, that for the Orthodox the filioque is quite a big deal: it is not a mere theological Spitzfindigkeit.
Ware's exposition -- which I assume is a faithful representation of the Orthodox position -- saddles filioquism with a nasty dilemma: either ditheism or semi-Sabellianism. For if the Son as well as the Father is an arche, a principle of unity in the Godhead, then the upshot is ditheism, two-God-ism. But if it is said that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son tamquam ex/ab uno principio, 'as from one principle,' then, as the Orthodox see it, the Father and the Son are confused and semi-Sabellianism is the upshot. (221)
Sabellianism or modalism is the view that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are modes or aspects of the deity. The East sees semi-Sabellianism in the West insofar as the Western view, in avoiding ditheism, merges Father and Son into one principle so that they become mere modes or aspect of that one principle.
That's the lay of the land as seen from the East. I have been concerned in this post with exposition only. Adjudication can wait for later. (He said magisterially.)
Monday, June 28, 2010
a happy family?
capitalism: a love story...
socialism: an uptight father
existentialism: a wise grandmother
liberalism: a rebellious son
communism: a conformist mom to the uptight father
humanism: the uncle who stays with us at home because he doesnt have a job
socialism: an uptight father
existentialism: a wise grandmother
liberalism: a rebellious son
communism: a conformist mom to the uptight father
humanism: the uncle who stays with us at home because he doesnt have a job
Saturday, June 26, 2010
A Difficulty With Haecceity Properties
imported from http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2010/06/my-difficulty-with-haecceity-properties.html
By popular demand, here is revised version of a post that first appeared on the old blog in July of 2005.
Introduction. I find haecceity properties hard to accept, although I grant they they would do various useful jobs if they existed. ('Haecceity' from the Latin haecceitas, thisness.) In this post I explain one or two of my reasons for nonacceptance. If you know your Plantinga, you will know that he is my primary target in these notes. This post is not about Duns Scotus or any medieval.
Definition. Suppose we take on board for the space of this post the assumptions that (i) properties are abstract objects, that (ii) they can exist unexemplified, and that (iii) they are necessary beings. We may then define the subclass of haecceity properties as follows.
A haecceity is a property H of x such that: (i) H is essential to x; (ii) nothing distinct from x exemplifies H in the actual world; (iii) nothing distinct from x exemplifies H in any metaphysically possible world.
So if there is a property of Socrates that is his haecceity, then there is a property that individuates him, and indeed individuates him across all times and worlds at which he exists: it is a property that he must have, that nothing distinct from him has, and that nothing distinct from him could have. Call this property Socrateity. Being abstract and necessary, Socrateity is obviously distinct from Socrates, who is concrete and contingent. Socrateity exists in every world, but is exemplified (instantiated) in only some worlds. What's more, Socrateity exists at every time in every world that is temporally qualified, whereas Socrates exist in only some worlds and only at some times in the worlds in which he exists. Haecceity properties have various uses. I'll mention just one.
Use. Suppose I need to analyze 'Socrates might not have existed.' I start with the rewrite, 'Possibly, Socrates does not exist' which features a modal operator operating upon an unmodalized proposition. But 'Socrates does not exist,' being a negative existential proposition, gives rise to an ancient puzzle dating back to Plato. How is reference to the nonexistent possible? The sentence 'Socrates does not exist' is apparently about Socrates, but how so given that he does not exist? If the meaning of 'Socrates' is the name's referent, and nothing can be a referent of a term unless it exists, then Socrates must exist if he is to have nonexistence predicated of him. But the whole point of the sentence is to say that our man does not exist. How can one say of a thing that it does not exist without presupposing that it exists? Haecceities provide a solution. We can understand 'Socrates does not exist' to be about Socrateity rather than about Socrates, and to predicate of Socrateity the property of being exemplified. Recall that Socrateity, unlike Socrates, exists at every time and in every world. So this property, unlike Socrates, is always and necessarily available. Accordingly, we analyze 'Possibly, Socrates does not exist' as 'Possibly, Socrateity is not exemplified.' Socrates' possible nonexistence boils down to Socrateity's possible nonexemplification. It is a nice, elegant solution to the puzzle --assuming that there are haecceity properties.
Problem. One of the stumbling blocks for me, however, is the notion that the thisness of an individual could exist even if the individual whose thisness it is does not exist. Consider the time before Socrates existed. During that time, Socrateity existed. But what content could that property have during that time (or in those possible worlds) in which Socrates does not exist? Socrateity is identity-with-Socrates. Presumably, then, the property has two constituents: identity, a property had by everything, and Socrates. Now if Socrates is a constituent of identity-with-Socrates, then it seems quite obvious that Socrateity can exist only at those times and in those worlds at which Socrates exists. Socrateity would then be like Socrates' singleton, the set consisting of Socrates and Socrates alone: {Socrates}. Clearly, this set cannot exist unless Socrates exists. It is ontologically dependent on him. The same would be true of identity-with-Socrates if Socrates were a constituent of this property.
Problem Exacerbated. If, on the other hand, Socrates is not a constituent of Socrateity, then what gives identity-with-Socrates the individuating content that distinguishes it from identity-with-Plato and identity-with-Pegasus? Consider a possible world W in which Socrates, Plato, and Pegasus do not exist. In W, their haecceities exist since haecceities ex hypothesi exist in every world. What distinguishes these haecceities in W? Nothing that I can see. The only things that could distinguish them would be Socrates, Plato, and Pegasus; but these individuals do not exist in W. It might be said that haecceity properties are simple: identity-with-Socrates is not compounded of identity and Socrates, or of anything else. Different haecceities just differ and they have the content they do in an unanalyzable way. But on this suggestion haecceities seem wholly ungraspable or inconceivable or ineffable, and this militates against thinking of them as properties. I have no problem with the notion of a property that only one thing has, nor do I have a problem with a property that only one thing can have; but a property that I cannot grasp or understand or conceive or bring before my mind -- such an item does not count as a property in my book. It would be more like a bare particular and inherit mutatis mutandis the unintelligibility of bare particulars.
Haecceities must be nonqualitative. Consider a conjunctive property the conjuncts of which are all the mutiply exemplifiable properties a thing has in the actual world. Such a property would individuate its possessor in the actual world: it would be a property that its possessor and only its possessor would have in the actual world. Such a property is graspable in that I can grasp its components (say, being barefooted, being snubnosed, being married, etc.) and I can grasp its construction inasmuch as I understand property conjunction. But the only way I can grasp Socrateity is by grasping is as a compound of identity and Socrates -- which it cannot be for reasons given above.
Note that Socrateity is not equivalent to the big conjunctive property just mentioned. Take the conjunction of all of Socrates' properties in the actual world and call it K. In the actual world, Socrates has K. But there are possible worlds in which he exists but does not exemplify K. And there are possible worlds in which K is exemplified by someone distinct from him. So Socrateity and K are logically nonequivalent. What we need, then, if we are to construct a qualitative thisness or haecceity of Socrates is a monstrous disjunctive property D[soc] the disjuncts of which are all the K's Socrates has in all the possible worlds in which he exists. This monstrous disjunction of conjunctions is graspable, not in person so to speak, but via our grasp of the operations of conjunction and disjunction and in virtue of the fact that each component property is graspable. But D[soc] is not identical to Socrateity. The former is a qualitative thisness whereas the latter is a nonqualitative thisness. Unless the Identity of Indiscernibles is true, these two thisnesses are nonequivalent. And there are good reasons to think that the Identity of Indiscernibles is not true. (Max Black's iron spheres, etc.) So D[Soc] is not identical to Socrateity.
Conclusion. To compress my main point into one sentence: identity-with-Socrates is graspable only as a compound of identity and Socrates; but then this property cannot exist unexemplified. Hence haecceity properties as defined above do not exist.
COMMENT
Scotus actually says
...sensus non cognoscit obiectum in quantum est distinctum a quolibet quod non est unum ista unitate numerali; quod patet, quia nullus sensus distinguit hunc radium Solis differre numeraliter ab illo radio, cum tamen sint diversi per motum Solis, si circumscribantur omnia sensibilia communia, puta diversitas loci vel situs; et si ponerentur duo quanta simul omnino per potentiam divinam, quae essent omnino similia et aequalia in albedine et quantitate, visus non distingueret ibi esse duo alba; si tamen cognosceret alterum istorum, in quantum est unum unitate numerali, cognosceret ipsum in quantum distinctum numeraliter a quolibet alio
"...sense does not know an object insofar as it is distinct from whatever is not one by that numerical unity, which is clear, because no sense distinguishes this ray of the sun to differ numerically from that ray, even though they are diverse through the motion of the sun, if all common sensibilia are set aside (such as diversity of place or position). And if two quanta were supposed to be exactly together by divine power, which were entirely similar and equal in whiteness and quantity, sight would not distinguish two white things to be there. If nevertheless it were to know one or the other of those, insofar as it is one by numerical unity, it would know it insofar as [it is] distinct numerically from any other". (Super distinctione III. libri II. sententiarum
quaestio i)
By popular demand, here is revised version of a post that first appeared on the old blog in July of 2005.
Introduction. I find haecceity properties hard to accept, although I grant they they would do various useful jobs if they existed. ('Haecceity' from the Latin haecceitas, thisness.) In this post I explain one or two of my reasons for nonacceptance. If you know your Plantinga, you will know that he is my primary target in these notes. This post is not about Duns Scotus or any medieval.
Definition. Suppose we take on board for the space of this post the assumptions that (i) properties are abstract objects, that (ii) they can exist unexemplified, and that (iii) they are necessary beings. We may then define the subclass of haecceity properties as follows.
A haecceity is a property H of x such that: (i) H is essential to x; (ii) nothing distinct from x exemplifies H in the actual world; (iii) nothing distinct from x exemplifies H in any metaphysically possible world.
So if there is a property of Socrates that is his haecceity, then there is a property that individuates him, and indeed individuates him across all times and worlds at which he exists: it is a property that he must have, that nothing distinct from him has, and that nothing distinct from him could have. Call this property Socrateity. Being abstract and necessary, Socrateity is obviously distinct from Socrates, who is concrete and contingent. Socrateity exists in every world, but is exemplified (instantiated) in only some worlds. What's more, Socrateity exists at every time in every world that is temporally qualified, whereas Socrates exist in only some worlds and only at some times in the worlds in which he exists. Haecceity properties have various uses. I'll mention just one.
Use. Suppose I need to analyze 'Socrates might not have existed.' I start with the rewrite, 'Possibly, Socrates does not exist' which features a modal operator operating upon an unmodalized proposition. But 'Socrates does not exist,' being a negative existential proposition, gives rise to an ancient puzzle dating back to Plato. How is reference to the nonexistent possible? The sentence 'Socrates does not exist' is apparently about Socrates, but how so given that he does not exist? If the meaning of 'Socrates' is the name's referent, and nothing can be a referent of a term unless it exists, then Socrates must exist if he is to have nonexistence predicated of him. But the whole point of the sentence is to say that our man does not exist. How can one say of a thing that it does not exist without presupposing that it exists? Haecceities provide a solution. We can understand 'Socrates does not exist' to be about Socrateity rather than about Socrates, and to predicate of Socrateity the property of being exemplified. Recall that Socrateity, unlike Socrates, exists at every time and in every world. So this property, unlike Socrates, is always and necessarily available. Accordingly, we analyze 'Possibly, Socrates does not exist' as 'Possibly, Socrateity is not exemplified.' Socrates' possible nonexistence boils down to Socrateity's possible nonexemplification. It is a nice, elegant solution to the puzzle --assuming that there are haecceity properties.
Problem. One of the stumbling blocks for me, however, is the notion that the thisness of an individual could exist even if the individual whose thisness it is does not exist. Consider the time before Socrates existed. During that time, Socrateity existed. But what content could that property have during that time (or in those possible worlds) in which Socrates does not exist? Socrateity is identity-with-Socrates. Presumably, then, the property has two constituents: identity, a property had by everything, and Socrates. Now if Socrates is a constituent of identity-with-Socrates, then it seems quite obvious that Socrateity can exist only at those times and in those worlds at which Socrates exists. Socrateity would then be like Socrates' singleton, the set consisting of Socrates and Socrates alone: {Socrates}. Clearly, this set cannot exist unless Socrates exists. It is ontologically dependent on him. The same would be true of identity-with-Socrates if Socrates were a constituent of this property.
Problem Exacerbated. If, on the other hand, Socrates is not a constituent of Socrateity, then what gives identity-with-Socrates the individuating content that distinguishes it from identity-with-Plato and identity-with-Pegasus? Consider a possible world W in which Socrates, Plato, and Pegasus do not exist. In W, their haecceities exist since haecceities ex hypothesi exist in every world. What distinguishes these haecceities in W? Nothing that I can see. The only things that could distinguish them would be Socrates, Plato, and Pegasus; but these individuals do not exist in W. It might be said that haecceity properties are simple: identity-with-Socrates is not compounded of identity and Socrates, or of anything else. Different haecceities just differ and they have the content they do in an unanalyzable way. But on this suggestion haecceities seem wholly ungraspable or inconceivable or ineffable, and this militates against thinking of them as properties. I have no problem with the notion of a property that only one thing has, nor do I have a problem with a property that only one thing can have; but a property that I cannot grasp or understand or conceive or bring before my mind -- such an item does not count as a property in my book. It would be more like a bare particular and inherit mutatis mutandis the unintelligibility of bare particulars.
Haecceities must be nonqualitative. Consider a conjunctive property the conjuncts of which are all the mutiply exemplifiable properties a thing has in the actual world. Such a property would individuate its possessor in the actual world: it would be a property that its possessor and only its possessor would have in the actual world. Such a property is graspable in that I can grasp its components (say, being barefooted, being snubnosed, being married, etc.) and I can grasp its construction inasmuch as I understand property conjunction. But the only way I can grasp Socrateity is by grasping is as a compound of identity and Socrates -- which it cannot be for reasons given above.
Note that Socrateity is not equivalent to the big conjunctive property just mentioned. Take the conjunction of all of Socrates' properties in the actual world and call it K. In the actual world, Socrates has K. But there are possible worlds in which he exists but does not exemplify K. And there are possible worlds in which K is exemplified by someone distinct from him. So Socrateity and K are logically nonequivalent. What we need, then, if we are to construct a qualitative thisness or haecceity of Socrates is a monstrous disjunctive property D[soc] the disjuncts of which are all the K's Socrates has in all the possible worlds in which he exists. This monstrous disjunction of conjunctions is graspable, not in person so to speak, but via our grasp of the operations of conjunction and disjunction and in virtue of the fact that each component property is graspable. But D[soc] is not identical to Socrateity. The former is a qualitative thisness whereas the latter is a nonqualitative thisness. Unless the Identity of Indiscernibles is true, these two thisnesses are nonequivalent. And there are good reasons to think that the Identity of Indiscernibles is not true. (Max Black's iron spheres, etc.) So D[Soc] is not identical to Socrateity.
Conclusion. To compress my main point into one sentence: identity-with-Socrates is graspable only as a compound of identity and Socrates; but then this property cannot exist unexemplified. Hence haecceity properties as defined above do not exist.
COMMENT
Scotus actually says
...sensus non cognoscit obiectum in quantum est distinctum a quolibet quod non est unum ista unitate numerali; quod patet, quia nullus sensus distinguit hunc radium Solis differre numeraliter ab illo radio, cum tamen sint diversi per motum Solis, si circumscribantur omnia sensibilia communia, puta diversitas loci vel situs; et si ponerentur duo quanta simul omnino per potentiam divinam, quae essent omnino similia et aequalia in albedine et quantitate, visus non distingueret ibi esse duo alba; si tamen cognosceret alterum istorum, in quantum est unum unitate numerali, cognosceret ipsum in quantum distinctum numeraliter a quolibet alio
"...sense does not know an object insofar as it is distinct from whatever is not one by that numerical unity, which is clear, because no sense distinguishes this ray of the sun to differ numerically from that ray, even though they are diverse through the motion of the sun, if all common sensibilia are set aside (such as diversity of place or position). And if two quanta were supposed to be exactly together by divine power, which were entirely similar and equal in whiteness and quantity, sight would not distinguish two white things to be there. If nevertheless it were to know one or the other of those, insofar as it is one by numerical unity, it would know it insofar as [it is] distinct numerically from any other". (Super distinctione III. libri II. sententiarum
quaestio i)
Sunday, June 20, 2010
Chinese still face discrimination in Indonesia
http://www.upiasia.com/Society_Culture/2010/03/10/chinese_still_face_discrimination_in_indonesia/7057/
By Harjo Winoto
Guest Commentary
Jakarta, Indonesia — It is conventional wisdom that Indonesia’s education policy has traditionally discriminated against the Chinese minority living in the country. For a long time – especially before the 1998 downfall of President Suharto – the Chinese have not enjoyed equal educational opportunities.
For example, there would be a limited number of seats – or no seat at all – for Chinese on certain faculties; Chinese have had extreme difficulty in applying for scholarships; and they have faced impediments in seeking careers in state institutions such as the police, judiciary, legislature or government.
This phenomenon dates back to a post-1945 compromise in which Chinese were encouraged in economic activities while non-Chinese – especially the Javanese – had priority in running the country. A similar political compromise was made in Malaysia. Although in terms of its written laws discrimination has abated in Indonesia, in practice – with only trifling changes – discrimination is still rampant, particularly in Medan and cities far from Jakarta.
Given such circumstances, Chinese are inclined to seek better opportunities abroad if possible. Many Chinese do not want to stay in Indonesia to work, pay taxes and contribute their ideas and energy to the country.
It is a common secret, especially prior to 1998, that state universities have been exclusively reserved for non-Chinese. Since state universities are among the best schools, and it is expensive to study abroad, many young Chinese are denied access to the best education.
One outrageous story is that of a Chinese participant in the International Chemistry Olympics from my high school. Prior to qualifying for the international round, this student requested financial support and the use of school facilities from the Department of Education and his school. Both requests were declined. The department reasoned that he should seek such support from his own school, while his school reasoned that since he represented Indonesia he should seek support from the Department of Education.
In the end he had to raise funds on his own. Fortunately, he placed second in the competition. Noting his achievement, both the government and the school requested that his winner’s cup be placed in their “collection of achievements.” At the same time, a reputable university in Singapore offered him a full scholarship and financial support for his undergraduate degree under the condition that he register his cup under that university.
Some non-Chinese have faced a similar plight as the government simply does not fund such programs. But the reality is tougher for the Chinese.
Another story that may elicit similar outrage is the blatant discrimination in the faculty of medicine at one reputable university in North Sumatra. Many Chinese studying there have expressed outrage and discontent as to how placement tests were conducted. Out of 300, only 20 seats were available for Chinese until at least 2006. This limit was set before the test results were published. One non-Chinese student remarked, “Had the test results been transparantly disclosed, perhaps 70 to 80 percent of the seats would be assigned to Chinese.”
This is only a glimpse of the discrimination Chinese face with regard to access to education, either endorsed by law or condoned in practice.
Some people defend this reality, saying that discrimination is treating similar things differently; therefore it is not discrimination to treat Chinese differently from non-Chinese, as the two groups have unequal economic power. Second, even if there is discrimination, some argue that it aims to correct imbalances, hence it is justifiable. Third, it is the Chinese people’s fault if they are discriminated against, as they exhibit arrogance and ignorance toward the poor people.
The classic case for justifying discimination is that since the Chinese grew rich by stealing from others’ land – noting that they were originally immigrants and therefore not entitled to anything – it is fair to correct imbalances by discriminating in favor of the original inhabitants of the land.
There are generally two types of imbalance – one that is inherent or natural, and the other that is caused by certain actions. For example, men and women are innately different physically; therefore it is not discriminatory to establish separate divisions in sport for men and women. However, rich and poor are not innate conditions. If a person is poor because he or she is lazy, policies that favor such a person are discriminatory.
It is utterly unfair to punish hard workers for being rich and reward paupers for their sloth. Wealth is not given, it is achieved by hard work. Many Chinese came to Indonesia – as they did to many other countries – with little more than the clothes they were wearing. It is therefore a wrong assumption that all or even a substantial number of Chinese are rich.
Moreover, the Chinese have to pay the same taxes others do; in fact, in practice many bureaucrats blackmail the Chinese, who end up paying more than others due to lack of education and fear. How can this be construed as stealing when everyone pays the same tax and has equal opportunities? Simply some are more efficient in business than others.
If we assume that corrective measures should be taken with regard to economic imbalances, the government should tax the rich more and subsidize the poor. However, the government should tax the rich, not the Chinese, if the policy is aimed at correcting an imbalance in the distribution of wealth.
Before arguing that the Chinese are arrogant and ignorant, we must put ourselves in the Chinese people’s shoes. When almost every door to career development is closed, the only space the Chinese have to maneuver in is business. Given this restriction, the fact that some Chinese have built empires from scratch is a superb achievement. Without condoning or condemning, it is human to be arrogant to a certain extent. Arrogance is a characteristic of the rich, including non-Chinese. It is not justifiable to punish someone for arrogance.
The late U.S. President John F. Kennedy famously said, “Ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country.” Many Indonesians feel that the Chinese are only taking from the country. But you cannot possibly ask someone to do something for you if you do nothing in return – or even worse, discriminate against them.
--
(Harjo Winoto is a final-year law student at the University of Indonesia and a paralegal in a top Jakarta law firm. He writes on various legal and social issues. ©Copyright Harjo Winoto.)
By Harjo Winoto
Guest Commentary
Jakarta, Indonesia — It is conventional wisdom that Indonesia’s education policy has traditionally discriminated against the Chinese minority living in the country. For a long time – especially before the 1998 downfall of President Suharto – the Chinese have not enjoyed equal educational opportunities.
For example, there would be a limited number of seats – or no seat at all – for Chinese on certain faculties; Chinese have had extreme difficulty in applying for scholarships; and they have faced impediments in seeking careers in state institutions such as the police, judiciary, legislature or government.
This phenomenon dates back to a post-1945 compromise in which Chinese were encouraged in economic activities while non-Chinese – especially the Javanese – had priority in running the country. A similar political compromise was made in Malaysia. Although in terms of its written laws discrimination has abated in Indonesia, in practice – with only trifling changes – discrimination is still rampant, particularly in Medan and cities far from Jakarta.
Given such circumstances, Chinese are inclined to seek better opportunities abroad if possible. Many Chinese do not want to stay in Indonesia to work, pay taxes and contribute their ideas and energy to the country.
It is a common secret, especially prior to 1998, that state universities have been exclusively reserved for non-Chinese. Since state universities are among the best schools, and it is expensive to study abroad, many young Chinese are denied access to the best education.
One outrageous story is that of a Chinese participant in the International Chemistry Olympics from my high school. Prior to qualifying for the international round, this student requested financial support and the use of school facilities from the Department of Education and his school. Both requests were declined. The department reasoned that he should seek such support from his own school, while his school reasoned that since he represented Indonesia he should seek support from the Department of Education.
In the end he had to raise funds on his own. Fortunately, he placed second in the competition. Noting his achievement, both the government and the school requested that his winner’s cup be placed in their “collection of achievements.” At the same time, a reputable university in Singapore offered him a full scholarship and financial support for his undergraduate degree under the condition that he register his cup under that university.
Some non-Chinese have faced a similar plight as the government simply does not fund such programs. But the reality is tougher for the Chinese.
Another story that may elicit similar outrage is the blatant discrimination in the faculty of medicine at one reputable university in North Sumatra. Many Chinese studying there have expressed outrage and discontent as to how placement tests were conducted. Out of 300, only 20 seats were available for Chinese until at least 2006. This limit was set before the test results were published. One non-Chinese student remarked, “Had the test results been transparantly disclosed, perhaps 70 to 80 percent of the seats would be assigned to Chinese.”
This is only a glimpse of the discrimination Chinese face with regard to access to education, either endorsed by law or condoned in practice.
Some people defend this reality, saying that discrimination is treating similar things differently; therefore it is not discrimination to treat Chinese differently from non-Chinese, as the two groups have unequal economic power. Second, even if there is discrimination, some argue that it aims to correct imbalances, hence it is justifiable. Third, it is the Chinese people’s fault if they are discriminated against, as they exhibit arrogance and ignorance toward the poor people.
The classic case for justifying discimination is that since the Chinese grew rich by stealing from others’ land – noting that they were originally immigrants and therefore not entitled to anything – it is fair to correct imbalances by discriminating in favor of the original inhabitants of the land.
There are generally two types of imbalance – one that is inherent or natural, and the other that is caused by certain actions. For example, men and women are innately different physically; therefore it is not discriminatory to establish separate divisions in sport for men and women. However, rich and poor are not innate conditions. If a person is poor because he or she is lazy, policies that favor such a person are discriminatory.
It is utterly unfair to punish hard workers for being rich and reward paupers for their sloth. Wealth is not given, it is achieved by hard work. Many Chinese came to Indonesia – as they did to many other countries – with little more than the clothes they were wearing. It is therefore a wrong assumption that all or even a substantial number of Chinese are rich.
Moreover, the Chinese have to pay the same taxes others do; in fact, in practice many bureaucrats blackmail the Chinese, who end up paying more than others due to lack of education and fear. How can this be construed as stealing when everyone pays the same tax and has equal opportunities? Simply some are more efficient in business than others.
If we assume that corrective measures should be taken with regard to economic imbalances, the government should tax the rich more and subsidize the poor. However, the government should tax the rich, not the Chinese, if the policy is aimed at correcting an imbalance in the distribution of wealth.
Before arguing that the Chinese are arrogant and ignorant, we must put ourselves in the Chinese people’s shoes. When almost every door to career development is closed, the only space the Chinese have to maneuver in is business. Given this restriction, the fact that some Chinese have built empires from scratch is a superb achievement. Without condoning or condemning, it is human to be arrogant to a certain extent. Arrogance is a characteristic of the rich, including non-Chinese. It is not justifiable to punish someone for arrogance.
The late U.S. President John F. Kennedy famously said, “Ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country.” Many Indonesians feel that the Chinese are only taking from the country. But you cannot possibly ask someone to do something for you if you do nothing in return – or even worse, discriminate against them.
--
(Harjo Winoto is a final-year law student at the University of Indonesia and a paralegal in a top Jakarta law firm. He writes on various legal and social issues. ©Copyright Harjo Winoto.)
ASEAN-China free trade pact is not all bad
http://www.upiasia.com/Economics/2010/03/29/asean-china_free_trade_pact_is_not_all_bad/2619/
By Harjo Winoto
Guest Commentary
Jakarta, Indonesia — How do we generally picture free trade or trade liberalization? We think of dreaded competition and lost jobs and livelihoods. To make matters worse, free traders and economists such as Paul Krugman claim that free trade is not concerned about “phony jobs” created or lost.
To the ears of common folks, this sounds pompous, nonchalant and merciless. Personally, I would call it an idea lost in translation. This is misquoted and largely misunderstood.
In Indonesia, there are two typical claims against free trade in general. First, usually cited in the context of trade with China, is the claim that we will import more than we export. In other words, we will spend more than we earn.
Second is the concept that free trade generates a larger economic “pie,” but it is not distributed proportionally to every segment of society. Hence, sacrificing jobs of the paupers for the benefit of the rich is not worthwhile. Even if free trade makes for a more efficient economy, most people prefer less efficiency if it helps the poor. In other words, it is better to have less money used for the needy rather than more money amassed in the pockets of the rich.
Actually, in the context of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement, these two claims are not as bad as they sound. First, opposition to the ACFTA generally revolves around the fact that China’s manufacturing base is currently the largest in the world. Moreover, it is a fact that China can produce almost any goods or products. A Chinese saying suggests, “We can duplicate and produce anything except your mother.” Hence, by liberalizing trade, we will import more than we export.
What do we get when we import? Goods of all kinds – shoes, clothes, washing machines that are produced in China using resources from China or other countries. What do the Chinese get in return? Money – many pieces of paper – which they will use to buy oil or raw materials for the next wave of products. Of course, if we keep buying products from China, our money supplies will diminish, so we will need to print more money. This will erode the purchasing power of our currency.
Still, the question is how much do we lose compared to what we gain? We get all the goods we need for our daily lives and they in return receive astronomical quantities of money.
Will China use any of this money to purchase oil and raw materials for their manufacturing industry from Indonesia? Under ACFTA, will the money China receives from our consumers be used to purchase goods and services from us? If China buys oil or raw materials from other countries, the stored value is used against other countries.
In fact, we will not trade any of our goods with China. On the contrary, we will receive goods and give them pieces of money which will be used to purchase goods, such as oil and raw materials, from other countries.
Opponents of ACFTA and trade liberalization argue that many jobs will be lost because domestic industries, which should be producing goods for our own consumption, will go out of business.
But there are two negative implications to protecting noncompetitive jobs. First, it prevents increased productivity, and second, it penalizes the rest of the people, who must pay more than they should for goods they need. There is a double penalty for protecting jobs that produce basic goods and necessities such as food and clothes; both the economy and the people are penalized. Productivity suffers as there is no incentive for efficient production. Efficiently produced goods cannot compete with subsidized goods because their prices remain expensive relative to subsidized goods, thanks to tariffs.
I would argue that it is much better for the government to support the people who are losing their jobs domestically than to damage the economy and force them to pay more for basic goods and necessities.
A core question is what do jobs mean? Are they to generate money or to provide the people with dignity, pride and status – or both? If both, what is the priority? Would we still work at jobs for the purpose of dignity if they did not generate money?
In the government’s mind, jobs are meant to increase the people’s welfare and protect their livelihoods. Under this premise, wouldn’t it be better for farmers to lose their jobs if their children can go to school, and if when they are sick they have access to government-funded healthcare? Or better, farmers can look for alternative and more satisfying jobs through education or training.
We need to see clearly through the heavily fogged glass on the ACFTA issue. It is not all bad – in fact, it is not bad at all. Politics and vested interests should be set aside if we want this to work. In any case, Indonesia has already ratified the agreement and there is no way back. Therefore we should clear up the fog and take a clear look at what lies ahead.
--
(Harjo Winoto is a final-year law student at the University of Indonesia and a paralegal in a top Jakarta law firm. He writes on various legal and social issues. He can be contacted at harjo_winoto@hotmail.com. ©Copyright Harjo Winoto.)
By Harjo Winoto
Guest Commentary
Jakarta, Indonesia — How do we generally picture free trade or trade liberalization? We think of dreaded competition and lost jobs and livelihoods. To make matters worse, free traders and economists such as Paul Krugman claim that free trade is not concerned about “phony jobs” created or lost.
To the ears of common folks, this sounds pompous, nonchalant and merciless. Personally, I would call it an idea lost in translation. This is misquoted and largely misunderstood.
In Indonesia, there are two typical claims against free trade in general. First, usually cited in the context of trade with China, is the claim that we will import more than we export. In other words, we will spend more than we earn.
Second is the concept that free trade generates a larger economic “pie,” but it is not distributed proportionally to every segment of society. Hence, sacrificing jobs of the paupers for the benefit of the rich is not worthwhile. Even if free trade makes for a more efficient economy, most people prefer less efficiency if it helps the poor. In other words, it is better to have less money used for the needy rather than more money amassed in the pockets of the rich.
Actually, in the context of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement, these two claims are not as bad as they sound. First, opposition to the ACFTA generally revolves around the fact that China’s manufacturing base is currently the largest in the world. Moreover, it is a fact that China can produce almost any goods or products. A Chinese saying suggests, “We can duplicate and produce anything except your mother.” Hence, by liberalizing trade, we will import more than we export.
What do we get when we import? Goods of all kinds – shoes, clothes, washing machines that are produced in China using resources from China or other countries. What do the Chinese get in return? Money – many pieces of paper – which they will use to buy oil or raw materials for the next wave of products. Of course, if we keep buying products from China, our money supplies will diminish, so we will need to print more money. This will erode the purchasing power of our currency.
Still, the question is how much do we lose compared to what we gain? We get all the goods we need for our daily lives and they in return receive astronomical quantities of money.
Will China use any of this money to purchase oil and raw materials for their manufacturing industry from Indonesia? Under ACFTA, will the money China receives from our consumers be used to purchase goods and services from us? If China buys oil or raw materials from other countries, the stored value is used against other countries.
In fact, we will not trade any of our goods with China. On the contrary, we will receive goods and give them pieces of money which will be used to purchase goods, such as oil and raw materials, from other countries.
Opponents of ACFTA and trade liberalization argue that many jobs will be lost because domestic industries, which should be producing goods for our own consumption, will go out of business.
But there are two negative implications to protecting noncompetitive jobs. First, it prevents increased productivity, and second, it penalizes the rest of the people, who must pay more than they should for goods they need. There is a double penalty for protecting jobs that produce basic goods and necessities such as food and clothes; both the economy and the people are penalized. Productivity suffers as there is no incentive for efficient production. Efficiently produced goods cannot compete with subsidized goods because their prices remain expensive relative to subsidized goods, thanks to tariffs.
I would argue that it is much better for the government to support the people who are losing their jobs domestically than to damage the economy and force them to pay more for basic goods and necessities.
A core question is what do jobs mean? Are they to generate money or to provide the people with dignity, pride and status – or both? If both, what is the priority? Would we still work at jobs for the purpose of dignity if they did not generate money?
In the government’s mind, jobs are meant to increase the people’s welfare and protect their livelihoods. Under this premise, wouldn’t it be better for farmers to lose their jobs if their children can go to school, and if when they are sick they have access to government-funded healthcare? Or better, farmers can look for alternative and more satisfying jobs through education or training.
We need to see clearly through the heavily fogged glass on the ACFTA issue. It is not all bad – in fact, it is not bad at all. Politics and vested interests should be set aside if we want this to work. In any case, Indonesia has already ratified the agreement and there is no way back. Therefore we should clear up the fog and take a clear look at what lies ahead.
--
(Harjo Winoto is a final-year law student at the University of Indonesia and a paralegal in a top Jakarta law firm. He writes on various legal and social issues. He can be contacted at harjo_winoto@hotmail.com. ©Copyright Harjo Winoto.)
Saturday, June 19, 2010
The unexamined life is not worth living
"The unexamined life is not worth living" Socrates
Dear Socrates,
I submit the following questions in my pursuit of understanding me, myself, and my being. I wish you were around, which sadly for the reason of "time and space" you cannot be around ergo I cannot communicate with "you" (being an independent existence, not a person). These questions have been examined and assessed for ages and I am aware there are no definite or easy answers for them. But, I just feel the need to inquire them. No matter who you are/what you are or where you are, it is my humble prayer to you that you listen, feel, and sense these questions. Bestow upon me, even the mere modicum of it, the wisdom to lead my life to a purpose, to something I can hold on, for hitherto I see myself in the mirror and I can see the abyss.
Yours,
"still searching for/examining it"
What is examine?
What is life?
what is life examination?
What is life not examined?
Why do we examine life?
Why do we not examine life?
How do we examine life?
How do we not examine life?
When and where do we examine life?
When and where do we not examine life?
Does the term "examine" refers to the process, the result or the whole sequence of input, process and result? Can we conclude that our life has been examined even if such examination is still in progress? Can we say the process of examination itself is a litmus test for the result?
Is it exclusive that unexamined life is not worth living? Why?
Is life more difficult and more beautiful at the same time when we start looking for the answers? Can be more difficult = more beautiful/meaningful?
What if the answers are not there? will the process still be meaningful? What if we are told they do not exist and they have been tested through time, so life is easier if we simply just accept such "preconceived notion" of answer provided by "them"?
What if the answers exist, but I am not looking for then? In the spectrum of time of space what meaning of life was lost?
Why do we need meaning?
Ignorant is a bliss... Are you blissful? Is meaning of life and bliss of life of two different nature? Can they be the same? are there situations where they are the same and not? Is it an innate circumstance? Can human change that nature or can we change the way we see that nature?
"the list still goes on... I am still examining..."
Dear Socrates,
I submit the following questions in my pursuit of understanding me, myself, and my being. I wish you were around, which sadly for the reason of "time and space" you cannot be around ergo I cannot communicate with "you" (being an independent existence, not a person). These questions have been examined and assessed for ages and I am aware there are no definite or easy answers for them. But, I just feel the need to inquire them. No matter who you are/what you are or where you are, it is my humble prayer to you that you listen, feel, and sense these questions. Bestow upon me, even the mere modicum of it, the wisdom to lead my life to a purpose, to something I can hold on, for hitherto I see myself in the mirror and I can see the abyss.
Yours,
"still searching for/examining it"
What is examine?
What is life?
what is life examination?
What is life not examined?
Why do we examine life?
Why do we not examine life?
How do we examine life?
How do we not examine life?
When and where do we examine life?
When and where do we not examine life?
Does the term "examine" refers to the process, the result or the whole sequence of input, process and result? Can we conclude that our life has been examined even if such examination is still in progress? Can we say the process of examination itself is a litmus test for the result?
Is it exclusive that unexamined life is not worth living? Why?
Is life more difficult and more beautiful at the same time when we start looking for the answers? Can be more difficult = more beautiful/meaningful?
What if the answers are not there? will the process still be meaningful? What if we are told they do not exist and they have been tested through time, so life is easier if we simply just accept such "preconceived notion" of answer provided by "them"?
What if the answers exist, but I am not looking for then? In the spectrum of time of space what meaning of life was lost?
Why do we need meaning?
Ignorant is a bliss... Are you blissful? Is meaning of life and bliss of life of two different nature? Can they be the same? are there situations where they are the same and not? Is it an innate circumstance? Can human change that nature or can we change the way we see that nature?
"the list still goes on... I am still examining..."
When Flimsy Trust is Broken: A Letter to Israel
http://en.hukumonline.com/app/dms/browser/detail/guid/lt4c1a15e93f6df
edited and polished by Eli Moselle
Thursday, 17 Jun 2010 | 19:40:11
Israel's Acts and Arrogance Impede Efforts to Bring Peace
Israeli Navy commandos stormed a Turkish flotilla last week (30/5), killing upwards of 9 passengers on a boat destined for Gaza with 10,000 tonnes of aid, sparking international condemnation and a diplomatic crisis. The tragedy is not just of 9 lost lives, but also of the damage to efforts to bring about peace in the region.
Israel-Palestine relations extend to many aspects of our modern politics; they represent the sharpest edges of two knives used by apparently opposite trends in the world to hurt each other. The discord is ageless, with both the Old Testament and Qur’an suggesting the land of Canaan belongs to one side or the other; the arbitrary, illogical basis for horrid wars throughout history.
At this point, the Israel-Palestine conflict has come to perfectly represent the complete degradation of politics.
People have had enough with pointless polemics; ‘liberalism versus communism,’ USSR and the United States, United States and North Korea, United States and the Middle East, and so on. Now, with the Israel-Palestine conflict, the cosmetic barriers being raised to differentiate Jew and Muslim – as if they really are that different – are simply a source of renewed disappointment.
Politics has strayed from its fundamental purpose, which is to promote peace and welbeing. The politics we behold in Israel-Palestine relations, which caricature international relations more broadly, is of greed, arrogance, and self-justification. In sum, these politics have only one basis – distrust of the ‘other’.
Meanwhile, we all dream of a peaceful world and put our trust in leaders who claim to know how to administer a government. It is trust which serves as the bond between government and society, and between governments and the international society.
At a time when collective unity is crucial to resolve global issues, the distrust between nations that is catalyzed by the Israel-Palestine conflict sets the canvas for international relations; a painting made with brushstrokes of suspicion and animosity. Such distrust is easily seen at international summits, the Copenhagen climate talks being a most clear example.
The argument here is that the enormous disappointment of the vast majority with their leaders in Copenhagen, an apparently ‘separate issue,’ is directly connected to distrust spawning from such conflicts as in Israel-Palestine. That conflict is simply toxic to international relations, and with the last incident against the Turkish flotilla, Israel has broken whatever semblance of flimsy trust existed of their integrity.
People can now only point their fingers to Israel as the culprit, whose exceedingly defensive manner ironically conveys nothing but an absolute expression of guilt. Even at the most objective level, what is happening in and to Gaza is a sin; Israel will have to bear it.
There may have been a time when Israel could justify its position to such allies as the United States, keeping its sins mostly unknown to the world, but it is over; a prototypic case of a snake biting the hands that feed it. With the latest attack, we see that not only does Israel resolutely fail to help people living in Gaza, it in fact intends that Gaza receive no help from others, destroying agents of aid in international waters.
8 out of 10 Gazans depend on foreign aid to survive. The World Food Program states that a minimum of 400 trucks a day into Gaza is required to meet basic nutritional needs, yet an average of 171 trucks of supplies enters Gaza per week.
We all sympathize with you for the holocaust, Israel. We do.
But we live in a dialectical world, one thing often giving rise to its opposite: if Israel acts as it has in the last several years, continuing to flagrantly abuse international laws and norms, and defecating on fundamental ideas of common decency, the cruel irony is that it comes ever-closer to becoming the contemporary Nazi that it claims to so despise. Cosmetic appearances aside, the purely objective self-justified evil underlying Israel’s current repertoire is palpable.
Mahatma Gandhi famously said that “an eye for an eye leaves the whole world blind.” Israel may be blinded by its explicitly-stated eye-for-two-eye ‘disproportionate response’ policy with Gaza, but history books will see this conflict as clearly as they did the Nazi-perpretrated holocaust. The idea that history repeats itself will be more than vindicated.
Stop, Israel. Stop.
Although you have reached the last and final minute for action, there is still time to stop; still time to save face. This is an international conflict between elites, borne on the sweaty, bloodied backs of dead and dying paupers.
The world needs trust more than ever, and Israel, you bear that responsibility by being placed in such a strategic zone. Your actions indicate exclusive thinking about Israeli people only: but take a moment to really think for your people; what good has adversarial imposition brought to your people? Since 1947, we see the same destructive response to the same issues, an endless repetition with the expectation of somehow achieving a different result; the clinical definition of insanity.
If you really care about doing the best for your people, Israel, the diplomatic route is one of humility.
Think for one second how ridiculous it sounds when you say that Israeli soldiers were attacked when ordered to board a civilian ship in international waters; that ‘resisting passengers attacked without provocation’. I would not be the first to say that this is like a carjacker complaining to a policeman that the driver hit him with a crowbar under the seat. How could one possibly expect a violated innocent to acquiesce peacefully?
Israel dreams of peace, but constructs it upon a foundation of war and militarism; a twisted dialectical nightmare.
To Israel, I say this.
If you dream of peace, then stop. That you committed an attack is one thing, but to defensively deny the mistake is another. The world may pardon your mistakes, absent such arrogance. The international community needs you. Now more than ever. Come back to us. Come back to us, and compassion may be extended to the lost boy in the living parable of the prodigal son.
Harjo Winoto is a final year law student, researcher on competition law, and writer on various social issues. He can be reached at harjo_winoto@hotmail.com.
edited and polished by Eli Moselle
Thursday, 17 Jun 2010 | 19:40:11
Israel's Acts and Arrogance Impede Efforts to Bring Peace
Israeli Navy commandos stormed a Turkish flotilla last week (30/5), killing upwards of 9 passengers on a boat destined for Gaza with 10,000 tonnes of aid, sparking international condemnation and a diplomatic crisis. The tragedy is not just of 9 lost lives, but also of the damage to efforts to bring about peace in the region.
Israel-Palestine relations extend to many aspects of our modern politics; they represent the sharpest edges of two knives used by apparently opposite trends in the world to hurt each other. The discord is ageless, with both the Old Testament and Qur’an suggesting the land of Canaan belongs to one side or the other; the arbitrary, illogical basis for horrid wars throughout history.
At this point, the Israel-Palestine conflict has come to perfectly represent the complete degradation of politics.
People have had enough with pointless polemics; ‘liberalism versus communism,’ USSR and the United States, United States and North Korea, United States and the Middle East, and so on. Now, with the Israel-Palestine conflict, the cosmetic barriers being raised to differentiate Jew and Muslim – as if they really are that different – are simply a source of renewed disappointment.
Politics has strayed from its fundamental purpose, which is to promote peace and welbeing. The politics we behold in Israel-Palestine relations, which caricature international relations more broadly, is of greed, arrogance, and self-justification. In sum, these politics have only one basis – distrust of the ‘other’.
Meanwhile, we all dream of a peaceful world and put our trust in leaders who claim to know how to administer a government. It is trust which serves as the bond between government and society, and between governments and the international society.
At a time when collective unity is crucial to resolve global issues, the distrust between nations that is catalyzed by the Israel-Palestine conflict sets the canvas for international relations; a painting made with brushstrokes of suspicion and animosity. Such distrust is easily seen at international summits, the Copenhagen climate talks being a most clear example.
The argument here is that the enormous disappointment of the vast majority with their leaders in Copenhagen, an apparently ‘separate issue,’ is directly connected to distrust spawning from such conflicts as in Israel-Palestine. That conflict is simply toxic to international relations, and with the last incident against the Turkish flotilla, Israel has broken whatever semblance of flimsy trust existed of their integrity.
People can now only point their fingers to Israel as the culprit, whose exceedingly defensive manner ironically conveys nothing but an absolute expression of guilt. Even at the most objective level, what is happening in and to Gaza is a sin; Israel will have to bear it.
There may have been a time when Israel could justify its position to such allies as the United States, keeping its sins mostly unknown to the world, but it is over; a prototypic case of a snake biting the hands that feed it. With the latest attack, we see that not only does Israel resolutely fail to help people living in Gaza, it in fact intends that Gaza receive no help from others, destroying agents of aid in international waters.
8 out of 10 Gazans depend on foreign aid to survive. The World Food Program states that a minimum of 400 trucks a day into Gaza is required to meet basic nutritional needs, yet an average of 171 trucks of supplies enters Gaza per week.
We all sympathize with you for the holocaust, Israel. We do.
But we live in a dialectical world, one thing often giving rise to its opposite: if Israel acts as it has in the last several years, continuing to flagrantly abuse international laws and norms, and defecating on fundamental ideas of common decency, the cruel irony is that it comes ever-closer to becoming the contemporary Nazi that it claims to so despise. Cosmetic appearances aside, the purely objective self-justified evil underlying Israel’s current repertoire is palpable.
Mahatma Gandhi famously said that “an eye for an eye leaves the whole world blind.” Israel may be blinded by its explicitly-stated eye-for-two-eye ‘disproportionate response’ policy with Gaza, but history books will see this conflict as clearly as they did the Nazi-perpretrated holocaust. The idea that history repeats itself will be more than vindicated.
Stop, Israel. Stop.
Although you have reached the last and final minute for action, there is still time to stop; still time to save face. This is an international conflict between elites, borne on the sweaty, bloodied backs of dead and dying paupers.
The world needs trust more than ever, and Israel, you bear that responsibility by being placed in such a strategic zone. Your actions indicate exclusive thinking about Israeli people only: but take a moment to really think for your people; what good has adversarial imposition brought to your people? Since 1947, we see the same destructive response to the same issues, an endless repetition with the expectation of somehow achieving a different result; the clinical definition of insanity.
If you really care about doing the best for your people, Israel, the diplomatic route is one of humility.
Think for one second how ridiculous it sounds when you say that Israeli soldiers were attacked when ordered to board a civilian ship in international waters; that ‘resisting passengers attacked without provocation’. I would not be the first to say that this is like a carjacker complaining to a policeman that the driver hit him with a crowbar under the seat. How could one possibly expect a violated innocent to acquiesce peacefully?
Israel dreams of peace, but constructs it upon a foundation of war and militarism; a twisted dialectical nightmare.
To Israel, I say this.
If you dream of peace, then stop. That you committed an attack is one thing, but to defensively deny the mistake is another. The world may pardon your mistakes, absent such arrogance. The international community needs you. Now more than ever. Come back to us. Come back to us, and compassion may be extended to the lost boy in the living parable of the prodigal son.
Harjo Winoto is a final year law student, researcher on competition law, and writer on various social issues. He can be reached at harjo_winoto@hotmail.com.
Tuesday, June 08, 2010
Purity: the innate quality we pursue
Purity is the essence we pursue. We adore jewelries made of pure diamond, ruby, emerald, et cetera.
We also pursue medicines made of pure materials, pure from the nature.
We despise the artificial creation, including beauty.
We pursue the purity of feelings, such as love,sympathy. We loathe people extending their condolence along with financial motives. We hate people being nice to us just because we are rich. They come to us with the expectation that we can give something (financial or monetary) in return. We want the pure care and love, detached and cleaned from every other motive. It is love, pure and simple.
the irony is why are there so many of us who not want or love the purity of thought (knowledge, wisdom, whatever you term it)?
Purity of knowledge seems to be the lost in our civilization, wiped out form the picture, removed from the lexicon...
Purity...
We also pursue medicines made of pure materials, pure from the nature.
We despise the artificial creation, including beauty.
We pursue the purity of feelings, such as love,sympathy. We loathe people extending their condolence along with financial motives. We hate people being nice to us just because we are rich. They come to us with the expectation that we can give something (financial or monetary) in return. We want the pure care and love, detached and cleaned from every other motive. It is love, pure and simple.
the irony is why are there so many of us who not want or love the purity of thought (knowledge, wisdom, whatever you term it)?
Purity of knowledge seems to be the lost in our civilization, wiped out form the picture, removed from the lexicon...
Purity...
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